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We consider the security of the BB84, six-state and SARG04 quantum key distribution protocols
when the eavesdropper doesn’t have access to a quantum memory. In this case, Eve’s most general
strategy is to measure her ancilla with an appropriate POVM designed to take advantage of the
post-measurement information that will be released during the sifting phase of the protocol. After
an optimization on all the parameters accessible to Eve, our method provides us with new bounds
for the security of six-state and SARG04 against a memoryless adversary. In particular, for the
six-state protocol we show that the maximum QBER for which a secure key can be extracted is
increased from 12.6% (for collective attacks) to 20.4% with the memoryless assumption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the invention of quantum key distribution
(QKD) and of its first protocol [1], a central issue in
QKD theory has been to find sets of assumptions under
which formal security proofs could be derived. In this
perspective, since Alice and Bob act as honest players,
only the unpredictable behavior of the attacker Eve
remains to be captured. Defining a security model thus
essentially reduces to making simplifying assumptions
allowing to bound the attacking capabilities of Eve.
However, for a security model to be of interest, it also
needs to fulfill several additional constraints and in
particular to allow a tractable derivation of security
proofs while presenting a level of generality ideally as
large as possible.
Intercept-resend (IR) attacks [2], are arguably the
simplest and the first attacks that have been considered
[1]. In this security model, Eve has in particular no
quantum memory and her strategy consists in making an
immediate measurement on a fraction of the individual
quantum states sent by Alice, and then to resend to Bob,
for each individual measurement, the quantum state cor-
responding to the eigenstate of her measurement result.
IR attacks can be optimized [3] and have the notable
interest of being implementable with current technology
[4, 5] since Eve is essentially playing a role similar to Bob.
IR attacks are however not very general and proving
the security of QKD within stronger security models has
rapidly attracted most of the attention of researchers.
This has been especially true concerning the search for
an unconditional security proof of QKD, i.e. a proof
valid against the most general quantum attacker. The
important theoretical efforts that have been invested in
this direction however proved that this was not easy,
∗ aurelien.bocquet@telecom-paristech.fr
and if BB84 [6–8] and several other QKD protocols
[9–12] have been proven secure against the most general
quantum attacker, it is however not the case yet for most
protocols. For this reason, weaker security models, that
dates back from the initial categorization of security
proofs [2], namely individual attacks and collective
attacks still play key roles as security models in QKD
and that have an important feature in common: they
rely on the assumption that Eve is in possession of a
quantum memory.
The assumption about the availability of a quantum
memory can however be challenged in practice. Recent
results on implementations of quantum memory [13, 14]
confirm that it is still technologically very hard to design
and build a reliable one: more precisely a high fidelity
quantum memory with an arbitrary long storage time
doesn’t exist yet. In the case of QKD, it is therefore
reasonable in a realistic setting to consider the adversary
to be memoryless: indeed, the honest participants
don’t need a quantum memory to perform a QKD
protocol, so that they can always wait long enough for
the eavesdropper memory to be completely noisy and
useless. Studying the security of a QKD protocol in
the memoryless adversary model is moreover useful to
quantitatively assess the influence of the “memoryless
assumption”. As explained above, this assumption is
realistic from a technological point of view but neverthe-
less leads to weakening the security model with respect
to individual attacks and of course stronger attacks.
The explicit derivation of the secure key rate under
the optimal memoryless attack allows to evaluate what
can be seen as a “memoryless trade-off”, namely the
performance gain versus the weakening of the security
model.
Despite this practical interest, academic works on the
subject are scarce. Since most of QKD security proofs
have so far been conducted under one of the main secu-
rity models (individual, collective and coherent attacks),
it was always assumed that Eve had a quantum memory
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2and memoryless attacks on QKD have not been studied
widely. For the case of the six-state [15] and SARG04
protocols [16], the optimal memoryless attacks have not
been studied to our knowledge. For the BB84 protocol,
one of the analyses on the subject [17] studied the optimal
POVM that Eve could use to measure the qubit flying
from Alice to Bob and found that a key could no longer
be extracted for a QBER greater than 15.4% against a
memoryless adversary. In our work, we confirm the op-
timality of this previously known bound on BB84 and
provide new tight bounds for the security of the six-state
and SARG04 protocols against a memoryless adversary.
After a short description of the QKD protocol con-
sidered, we discuss the construction of the attack model.
We then compute the secret key rate and optimize it over
all parameters before applying the method to the BB84,
six-state and SARG04 QKD protocols.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROTOCOL
To avoid the use of unnecessarily complicated nota-
tions, we describe our attack by using the BB84 protocol
with forward reconciliation [18]. The generalization of
the attack to the six-state and SARG04 protocols is then
straightforward as explained in section VI. Alice and Bob
have access to a quantum channel and a classical authen-
ticated channel. The protocol can be decomposed in 4
steps:
1. Preparation: For n ∈ N, Alice chooses randomly
xn = (x1, .., xn) ∈ {0, 1}n which represents the raw
key, θn = (θ1, .., θn) ∈ {0, 1}n which represents the
basis, and she prepares the state |φn〉 = Hθn |xn〉
before sending it to Bob who measures the state in
a random basis. The output of his measurement is
yn = (y1, .., yn) ∈ {0, 1}n.
2. Sifting: Alice and Bob publicly announce their
choice of basis and discard the instances where the
basis disagree. For simplicity (but without loss of
generality) we forget the bits when the bases dis-
agree. The resulting sifted raw keys are xn and
yn. Alice and Bob then use a small amount of raw
key to estimate the QBER: if it is below a certain
value they decide to resume the protocol, or else
they abort it.
3. Error correction: Based on the value of the
QBER, Alice computes an error correction message
Iec and sends it to Bob. Bob recovers x
n based on
yn and on the information provided by Alice Iec.
4. Privacy amplification: Alice and Bob use a two-
universal hashing function to transform their infor-
mation xn into a key of size l.
The preparation step in the protocol is described above
corresponds to a Prepare-and-Measure (P&M) scheme:
Alice uses a random number generator to prepare a quan-
tum state. This scheme doesn’t require Alice and Bob to
have a quantum memory and can be easily implemented
with today’s technology [18]. It is possible to trans-
form this protocol in an entangled-based (EB) scheme
whose security is easier to prove but which requires Al-
ice and Bob to have a quantum memory: instead of
randomly choosing the bits x and b to encode the in-
formation in |φ〉, Alice can prepare an entangled state
|Φ〉AB = |0〉A⊗|0〉B+|1〉B⊗|1〉B√2 , send half of the state to
Bob and finally measure her half in the basis b to get
the key string x: after this operation is repeated n times,
Bob holds the state |φ〉 in his laboratory. Clearly this
transformation makes the protocol much harder to im-
plement but the security of the EB scheme implies the
security of the easier to implement P&M scheme [19].
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE ATTACK MODEL
We consider the most general actions Eve can perform
to gain information with the restriction that she doesn’t
have a quantum memory. During the preparation phase,
Eve is allowed to let an ancilla interact with the qubit
flying from Alice to Bob and to measure this ancilla im-
mediately after the interaction with an arbitrary POVM.
If U is the unitary interaction applied by Eve to the sys-
tem, the attack can be represented by the quantum cir-
cuit presented in FIG. 1. After the interaction, Eve’s
ancilla is entangled to the flying qubit and the statistics
of any measurement performed on the ancilla can be cor-
related to the raw key shared by Alice and Bob. Based
on the classical information obtained from the measure-
ment and the basis information θ received afterwards,
Eve computes a guess on the raw key bit shared by Alice
and Bob. The computation of the probability that her
guess is correct is done in the next part of the article.
Hθ |x〉
U
|0〉E FE /. -,() *+Guess of x
θ
FIG. 1. Quantum circuit representing Eve’s attack in the
P&M scheme of the BB84 protocol
The attack represented in the P&M scheme on FIG.
1 can also be described in the equivalent EB scheme.
In this case, Alice initially prepares a pure state |Φ〉AB
and sends one half to Bob through the quantum chan-
nel. After the interaction with Eve (or equivalently, the
action of the quantum channel), Alice and Bob share
a mixed state ρAB = E(|Φ〉 〈Φ|AB) = TrE |Ψ〉 〈Ψ|ABE
where |Ψ〉ABE is a purification of this state. Eve can
perform a measurement on her part of the purification
3ρE = TrAB |Ψ〉 〈Ψ|ABE to gain some information on the
secret bit shared by Alice and Bob. We write X, Y and
K the random variables representing the results of the
measurements performed by Alice, Bob and Eve on their
part of the purification |Ψ〉ABE .
IV. COMPUTATION OF THE SECRET KEY
RATE
In our model, Eve doesn’t have a quantum memory
and must therefore measure immediately after the inter-
action the ancilla used in the attack. This means that
at the beginning of the classical post-processing of the
protocol, Alice, Bob and Eve share a classical probabil-
ity distribution. The size l of the secret key that can be
extracted after the privacy amplification is given by the
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner bound [20]
l = IAB − max
strategies
IAE (1)
= n[I(X : Y )− max
strategies
I(X : KΘ)],
where IAB is the mutual informations between Alice and
Bob and max IAE is the maximization on all the eaves-
dropping strategies of the mutual information between
Alice and Eve.
When Eve interacts with the flying qubit she alters it
in a way that generates some errors in Bob’s string. This
perturbation is described by the quantum bit error rate
Q measured by Alice and Bob. For a given QBER Q, the
mutual information between Alice’s and Bob’s bit string
is given by the capacity of the binary symmetric channel
I(X : Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ) = 1− h(Q), (2)
where h(p) = −p log2 p− (1−p) log2 (1− p) is the binary
entropy.
We now compute IAE , the mutual information between
Alice and Eve. After the reconciliation phase, Eve has
access to the result of her measurement K and to the
basis information Θ to guess the value of Alice’s bit. We
can then write that
I(X : KΘ) = H(X) +H(KΘ)−H(XKΘ) (3)
= 1 +H(K|Θ) +H(Θ)−H(K|XΘ)−H(XΘ)
= H(K|Θ)−H(K|XΘ)
where we used the fact that X and Θ are independent so
that H(X|Θ) = H(X) = 1. We can then compute the
conditional entropies:
H(K|XΘ) =
∑
x,θ
p(X = x,Θ = θ).H(K|X = x,Θ = θ)
=
1
4
∑
k,x,θ
Λ[p(K = k|X = x,Θ = θ)] (4)
and H(K|Θ) = 1
2
∑
k,θ
Λ[p(K = k|Θ = θ)] (5)
where Λ(x) = −x log2(x). The conditional probabilities
used in these formulas will be computed in the next
section.
Finally we compute the secret key rate r = l/n that
can be extracted from the protocol:
r = 1− h(Q)− max
strategies
[H(K|Θ)−H(K|XΘ)]. (6)
V. OPTIMIZATION OF EVE’S ATTACK
For a given QBER that Eve allows herself to create on
the channel between Alice and Bob, we want to maxi-
mize IAE over all possible interactions E and all possible
POVMs with the restriction that she doesn’t use a quan-
tum memory. To optimize IAE , we need in all generality
to take into account two elements:
• For each target QBER, we need to consider all the
possible interactions U that Eve can do. Equiva-
lently in the EB scheme we need to consider all the
purifications compatible with this QBER.
• We also need to consider all the measurements that
can be done on Eve’s part of the purification.
A. Computation of the purification |ΨABE〉
In the entangled based scheme of BB84, Alice prepares
an EPR state ρ0AB = |Φ+〉 〈Φ+| (where |Φ+〉 = |00〉+|11〉√2
is a Bell state) and sends one half to Bob. Due to Eve’s
action during the transmission, Alice and Bob now hold
a noisy version of ρ0AB that we denote by ρAB = E(ρ0AB).
Following [19], the security of BB84 can be studied with-
out loss of generality on attacks for which the state ρAB
is Bell diagonal. We can write
ρAB = α
∣∣Φ+〉 〈Φ+∣∣+ β ∣∣Φ−〉 〈Φ−∣∣+
γ
∣∣Ψ+〉 〈Ψ+∣∣+ δ ∣∣Ψ−〉 〈Ψ−∣∣ (7)
with α+ β + γ + δ = 1,
where |Φ±〉 = |00〉±|11〉√
2
and |Ψ±〉 = |01〉±|10〉√
2
.
During the protocol, Alice and Bob use a small fraction
of the raw key to estimate the QBER of their channel.
Let Q0 and Q1 be the QBER measured by Alice and Bob
when they measure in {|0〉 , |1〉} and {|+〉 , |−〉} respec-
tively. We can write the relation between Q0, Q1 and the
eigenvalues of ρAB as
Q0 = 〈01| ρAB |01〉+ 〈10| ρAB |10〉 = γ + δ, (8)
Q1 = 〈+−| ρAB |+−〉+ 〈−+| ρAB |−+〉 = β + δ.
If Alice and Bob measure a different value for Q0 and Q1,
it gives them a clue that the channel has been tampered
with. We therefore consider that Q0 = Q1 = Q. If we
keep α ∈ [1 − 2Q, 1 − Q] (for Q ∈ [0, 1/2]) as a free
4parameter, the state shared by Alice and Bob depends
only on α and Q:
ρAB = α
∣∣Φ+〉 〈Φ+∣∣+ (1−Q− α) ∣∣Φ−〉 〈Φ−∣∣+ (9)
(1−Q− α) ∣∣Ψ+〉 〈Ψ+∣∣+ (2Q− 1 + α) ∣∣Ψ−〉 〈Ψ−∣∣ .
Eve has access to a purification |ΨABE〉 of the state ρAB .
The Schmidt purification can be obtained very easily
from the orthonormal decomposition of ρAB :
|ΨABE〉 =
√
α
∣∣Φ+〉
AB
∣∣Φ+〉
E
+
√
1−Q− α ∣∣Φ−〉
AB
∣∣Φ−〉
E
+
√
1−Q− α ∣∣Ψ+〉
AB
∣∣Ψ+〉
E
(10)
+
√
2Q− 1 + α ∣∣Ψ−〉
AB
∣∣Ψ−〉
E
.
A purification is not unique but we can choose this one
without loss of generality since any purification of ρAB
can be obtained from |ΨABE〉 with a suitable unitary
acting on Eve’s part of the purification. This unitary
can be appended to the measurement performed by Eve
after the interactions so we can safely ignore it.
B. Optimization of IAE
To optimize her information, Eve wants to use the
fact that the basis information will be revealed during
the post-processing phase of the protocol. Even though
she doesn’t have access to a quantum memory and
thus can not wait until she has this information to
perform a measurement on her ancilla, she can choose
her POVM in such a way that the post-measurement
information will increase her knowledge on the raw key.
We use a method similar to the one used in [21] in the
case of state discrimination where it was argued that
the most general measurement strategy for Eve was to
use a POVM {Mx0x1}x0x1=00,01,10,11 with four possible
outcomes x0x1. When Eve gets the measurement result
x0x1, she waits for the basis information θ to be revealed
so that she can choose xθ as her guess.
The probability that Eve measures a certain value k
when Alice has obtained the result x in the basis θ can
be written as
p(K = k|X = x,Θ = θ) = Tr(MkρxθE ), (11)
where ρxθE represents Eve’s part of the purification when
Alice has obtained the result x after a measurement in
the basis θ. We can compute this state from ρABE =
|ΨABE〉 〈ΨABE |:
ρxθE =
TrAB [H
θ |x〉 〈x|Hθ ⊗ IB ⊗ IE .ρABE ]
Tr[Hθ |x〉 〈x|Hθ ⊗ IB ⊗ IE .ρABE ] . (12)
The optimization problem is now reduced to the compu-
tation of the optimal POVM that maximizes the mutual
information IAE . It can be stated as:
maximize I(X : KΘ)
such that
∑
i
Mi = I4 (13)
∀i , Mi > 0
FIG. 2. Mutual information IAB and IAE in the BB84 pro-
tocol against the QBER for several attack models
We solved this SDP problem numerically with the help
of CVX [22, 23] and SDPT3 [24] in MATLAB. In the next
section we present the results we obtained when we ap-
plied this method to three different QKD protocols: the
BB84, six-state and SARG04 QKD protocols.
VI. OPTIMAL MEMORYLESS ATTACKS FOR
DIFFERENT QKD PROTOCOLS
A. Optimal memoryless attacks on BB84
When applied to the BB84 QKD protocol, our opti-
mization gives us a numerical representation of the func-
tion IAE for all Q ∈ [0, 1/4]. It turns out that this result
corresponds exactly to the mutual information between
Alice and Eve that was computed in [17] where Eve was
allowed to perform a general POVM measurement di-
rectly on the flying qubit. The two methods agree on the
optimal memoryless attack and this gives us the expres-
sion of the mutual information between Alice and Eve as
it was computed in [17]:
IAE =
1
2
+
Λ[1 + (Q)]− Λ[(Q)]
2(1 + (Q))
(14)
with (Q) =
(
1−√8Q(1− 2Q)
1− 4Q
)2
(15)
In FIG. 2, we have plotted the mutual information IAB
against IAE for three different attack models: individual
attacks, collective attacks and the optimal memoryless
attacks on BB84.
We optimize Eve’s strategy on all the accessible param-
eters: the choice of the purification and the measurement
setting. Since we consider all the possible purifications
and use the most general strategy for the measurement,
5FIG. 3. Mutual information IAB and IAE in the SARG04
protocol against the QBER for several attack models
the result of our optimization is the optimal attack with-
out a quantum memory.
The memoryless attack is always less effective than
individual attacks and can never provide Eve with full
information on the raw key: indeed, the mutual infor-
mation IAE reaches its maximum of 1/2 for Q = 0.25.
However we can see that the individual attacks (which re-
quire a quantum memory) do not provide Eve with much
more information than the optimal memoryless attack.
It is well known that BB84 is secure against collective
attacks up to a QBER Q ≈ 11%. If you restrict the
eavesdropper to a memoryless attack, we find that the
BB84 protocol is then secure up to a QBER of 15.4%,
the same value that was computed in [17]. This is less
than one point more than the 14.6% corresponding to the
individual attacks.
B. SARG04
The SARG04 protocol [16] uses the same quantum
states as BB84 but with a different encoding of infor-
mation. In this protocol, Alice prepares a state Hθ |x〉
where the classical bit is represented by θ instead of
x as in BB84. This means that the states |0〉 and |1〉
code for the classical bit ”0” and the states |+〉 and
|−〉 code for the classical bit ”1”. For example, if Alice
chooses the classical bit ”0” and encodes it with the
state |0〉, in the sifting phase she can announce (|0〉 , |+〉)
to Bob. This does not give any information to Eve but
it gives Bob full information about the classical bit if
he measured in the basis |+〉 , |−〉 and got the result ”−”.
From the point of view of Eve, the attack is the same
that the one she does on the BB84 protocol. The dif-
ference with BB84 lies in the state ρAB . Indeed, if
we use the same notations as for BB84 with ρAB =
FIG. 4. Mutual information IAB and IAE in the six-state
protocol against the QBER for several attack models
α |Φ+〉 〈Φ+| + β |Φ−〉 〈Φ−| + γ |Ψ+〉 〈Ψ+| + δ |Ψ−〉 〈Ψ−|
we can follow [25] and write:
α+ β = 1−Q (16)
γ + δ = Q
so that we get:
ρAB = α
∣∣Φ+〉 〈Φ+∣∣+ (1−Q− α) ∣∣Φ−〉 〈Φ−∣∣+ (17)
(1− 3Q
2
− α) ∣∣Ψ+〉 〈Ψ+∣∣+ (5Q
2
− 1 + α) ∣∣Ψ−〉 〈Ψ−∣∣ .
After an optimization of the mutual information IAE over
all the POVMs that Eve can use to measure her ancilla,
we have computed that a key can be extracted for a
QBER of less than 17.5% against a memoryless adver-
sary compared to 14.8% for individual attacks [25]. The
mutual information between Alice and Eve for the indi-
vidual attacks and the memoryless attacks are plotted on
FIG. 3.
C. Optimal memoryless attacks on the six-state
protocol
The six-state protocol [9, 26] is an extension of the
BB84 protocol where three bases are used instead of
only two. In this case, Alice can choose between the
basis {|0〉 , |1〉}, { |0〉+|1〉√
2
, |0〉−|1〉√
2
} or { |0〉+i|1〉√
2
, |0〉−i|1〉√
2
} to
encode her state. As a consequence the probability that
Alice and Bob choose the same basis is only 1/3 com-
pared to 1/2 in BB84: during the sifting phase 2/3 on the
bits have to be discarded. The advantage of this protocol
is that its symmetry simplifies the analysis of its security
and reduces the amount of information gained by Eve for
a given QBER compared to BB84. Indeed, it was proven
in [9] that the six-state protocol can produce a secret key
6up to a QBER of 12.6% against the most general attacks.
The optimal memoryless attack on the six-state proto-
col follows the same procedure as the one described for
BB84. Without loss of generality, we study the security
of the six-state protocol against attacks for which the
state ρAB is diagonal in the Bell basis and can be writ-
ten as equation (7). Since Alice and Bob can compute
a QBER for three different bases, we get one additional
relation between the diagonal coefficients and the QBER
compared to equations (8). With the additional infor-
mation that Alice and Bob measure the same QBER on
each basis (the contrary would be a proof of tampering)
we can write:
ρAB = (1− 3Q
2
)
∣∣Φ+〉 〈Φ+∣∣+ Q
2
∣∣Φ−〉 〈Φ−∣∣+ (18)
Q
2
∣∣Ψ+〉 〈Ψ+∣∣+ Q
2
∣∣Ψ−〉 〈Ψ−∣∣ .
From this expression it is easy to get a purification
|ψABE〉:
|ψABE〉 =
√
1− 3Q
2
∣∣Φ+〉
AB
∣∣Φ+〉
E
+
√
Q
2
∣∣Φ−〉
AB
∣∣Φ−〉
E
+
√
Q
2
∣∣Ψ+〉
AB
∣∣Ψ+〉
E
+
√
Q
2
∣∣Ψ−〉
AB
∣∣Ψ−〉
E
.
It is then possible to optimize the mutual information
IAE on all the POVMs that Eve can use to measure her
system. The result of this optimization is plotted on FIG.
4 along with the mutual information for the collective [9]
and individual attacks [26] of the six-state protocol. We
find that a secret key can be extracted for a QBER of less
than 20.4% against a memoryless adversary compared to
12.6% and 15.6% for collective and individual attacks
respectively.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have shown how to construct the optimal memo-
ryless attacks on BB84, six-states and SARG04 with an
optimization of both the interaction U and the POVM
used by Eve. Our result confirms the optimality of the
previous bound of 15.4% derived in [17] in the case of
BB84. We also provide new bounds for the six-state and
SARG04 protocols against a memoryless adversary: the
QBER over which no key can be extracted is increased
to 20.4% and 17.6% respectively.
In this realistic model of a memoryless adversary, our
work provides a quantitative estimate of the trade-off
between the desired confidence on the security of the
protocol (unconditional security or memoryless security
model) and the achievable secret key rate.
Furthermore, the situation where the eavesdropper
doesn’t have access to a quantum memory is an extreme
case of a more general security model where the eaves-
dropper is allowed to use a noisy memory. In the future,
it will be interesting to study how the security bounds
of QKD protocols evolve with the amount of noise in the
eavesdropper’s quantum memory. This model could also
be used to prove the security of other protocols like the
differential phase shift [27] or continuous variables [28]
protocols against a memoryless adversary.
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